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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arose under the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court
found in Section 78-2(j), U.C.A. The appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals
under Section 78-2-2(4), U.C.A. Consideration of the appeal by certiorari is authorized by
Section 78-2-3(5), U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Multiple issues were presented for consideration by the Utah Court of Appeals. In
granting certiorari, this Court limited the issue for consideration to the following:
A.

Issue. Whether a bail agreement violates public policy to the extent it purports

to permit a bail enforcement agent not licensed in Utah to apprehend a fugitive.
B.

Standard of Review. The trial court's application of law will be reviewed

under a correctness standard with reversal justified if instructions to the jury were prejudicial
in that they misadvised or misled the jury on the law. Butler v. Naylor, 1999 Ut. 86,987 P.2d
41. Jury instructions are examined in their entirety and will be affirmed if the instruction
taken as a whole fairly instructs the jury on the law applicable to the case. Paulos v.
Covenant Transport, Inc., 2004 Ut. App. 35 86 P.3d 752.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Plaintiffs claim the following controls resolution of the issues presented:
A.

Section 31A-35-601, U.C.A. (1999).

B.

Title 53, Chapter 11, U.C.A. (1999).

These statutes are reproduced in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE. This is a tort action by two men for assault, false

imprisonment, and negligence or reckless endangerment arising from an assault by a
Colorado bail enforcement agent at the home of one of them in Utah.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. The incident which is the subject of this suit

occurred on April 2, 1999. The Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint with the Eighth District
Court in Uintah County on February 28, 2000. (R., p.3. Addendum A). All Defendants
eventually answered the complaint with Defendant Langley answering pro se. (R., p. 22).
Defendant, Ranger Insurance Company subsequently made a Cross-claim on March 7,2002
against Defendants Thorpe and Langley. (R., p. 114).
In March, 2002, current counsel for Plaintiffs appeared for the first time. (R., p. 116).
Counsel for Robert Thorpe withdrew. (R.,p. 140). The case was configured thereafter with
Plaintiffs and Ranger Insurance Company having legal counsel and Defendants Thorpe and
Langley acting pro se.
Discovery proceeded but Thorpe failed to show for his deposition and sanctions were
sought by the Plaintiffs in August, 2002. (R., p. 171). The sanctions were never imposed
2

after representations to the court by the wife of Thorpe that he had health problems. (R., p.
240). However, Thorpe also failed to respond to Requests for Admissions. (R., p. 356).
Trial was held before a jury for three days commencing February 2,2004. During the
course of the trial the court dismissed Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment.
(Trial Transcript (TT) at R. p. 1187 at pp. 213-216). The assault and reckless endangerment
claims were presented to the jury. (Jury Instructions R. pp. 1032-1034.)
Robert Thorpe failed to show for the trial. The court denied the request of Plaintiffs
to enter his default. (TT at R. p. 1187, p. 34). The court did grant the motion at trial of
Defendant Ranger Insurance Company to enter the default of Robert Thorpe on the crossclaim brought by Ranger and later entered a formal order. (R., p. 1261). Thorpe similarly
did not respond to the appeal at the Utah Court of Appeals.
This Court entered final judgment upon Plaintiffs' claims on March 17, 2004. (R., p.
1067). A Notice of Appeal was filed April 14, 2004. (R., p. 1143). Subsequently, Ranger
Insurance Company caused a formal judgment to be entered against Robert Thorpe upon its
cross-claim on October 13, 2004. (R., p. 1261). To be cautious about being sure the new
judgment against Thorpe long after trial did not create a new appeal time, a Second Notice
of Appeal was filed by Plaintiffs on November 12, 2004.
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Appeal was taken originally to the Utah Supreme Court. This Court transferred the
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on April 16, 2004. The Court of Appeals issued its
opinion after briefing and oral argument on August 4, 2005, affirming the result in the
District Court. Lee v. Langley, 2005 Ut. App. 339, 121 P.3d 33. (Addendum "B").
The Appellants petitioned for certiorari on August 25, 2005 and it was granted on
November 16, 2005, with respect to the one primary issue stated above.
C.

DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT. A jury verdict of no cause of action was

entered against the Plaintiffs on February 4, 2004. (R., p. 1053). The formal judgment
followed on March 17, 2004. (R., p. 1067). The judgment rendered was upon Plaintiffs
causes for assault and reckless endangerment with the false imprisonment claim having been
dismissed at trial as a matter of law.

RELEVANT FACTS
A.

THE PLAYERS.
George Lee, plaintiff and appellant, is a resident of Uintah County, Utah.

(Complaint, R., p. 3 at Addendum "A").
Gerald Lee, plaintiff and appellant, is the brother of George Lee and also resides in
Uintah County, Utah. (Complaint, R., p.3). He was the fugitive from the Colorado courts.

4

Miles Langley was a past police officer in the Grand Junction Colorado area, a
sometimes bar bouncer, and a sometimes bail enforcement agent or bounty hunter. (TT, R.,
p. 1187 at pp. 58-62).
Robert Thorpe was the owner of A-l Bail Bonds located in Grand Junction,
Colorado. His wife, Maria Thorpe, was also an agent with him. (Plaintiff Exhibit 2, p. 1.
R., p. 999 in Addendum "C").
Ranger Insurance Company is an insurer operating as a bail bond surety in Colorado
for A-1 Bail Bonds that had entered agency contracts with Robert and Maria Thorpe. Ranger
Insurance Company was not licensed to be a bail bond surety within the state of Utah. (TT,
R.,p. 1187 at 266).
B.

THE EVENTS.
Gerald Lee was arrested for driving under the influence and driving without proof of

insurance in late 1998 in the Grand Junction, Colorado area. He was jailed in Grand Junction
Colorado and released on bail issued by A-1 Bail Bonds operated by Robert Thorpe. (Gerald
Lee testimony at TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 105-106). Despite posting bail, Gerald missed his
court appearances in Colorado, claiming he was supposed to be in two courts at the same
time. (Lee testimony at TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 109-110). The bail contract provided Gerald
consented to apprehension upon violation of the requirement to appear. (Addendum "H").
5

Langley was hired by Robert Thorpe in Grand Junction to go get Gerald Lee for
jumping bail. (Langley Testimony, TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 73-78). Thorpe and Langley knew
Gerald was in Utah. Langley left Colorado for Utah with the intent of enforcing a Colorado
arrest warrant. He first checked in with local police in the Uintah County area and then went
alone to the home of George Lee, the brother of Gerald, in Naples, Utah. (Langley
testimony, TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 83-84).
Langley knocked on the door and George answered. Langley said he was from
Christian Brothers Construction Company and was looking for a good mechanic to hire and
heard that Gerald was looking for work. George invited him into the house through a door
into the kitchen area. Gerald came into the room and Langley again repeated he was from
a construction company and had a job for Gerald and extended his hand as if to shake hands.
Gerald extended his hand in response and Langley suddenly produced and placed a handcuff
on Gerald's arm. Gerald reacted by pushing Langley back and Langley, a very large man,
struck Gerald. George reacted to protect his brother and grabbed Langley. (Langley
testimony, TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 85-87). The facts diverge here but the Lees say that
Langley never said he was a bail enforcement agent and Langley admitted to that in the
Answer he filed with the court. (Langley Answer R.,p.22). Lees were reacting to a stranger
suddenly attacking Gerald. (Lee testimony TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 111-118; 189-195).
6

A short fight followed in which Langley beat up Gerald pretty well and left George
unconscious on the floor of the kitchen in a pool of blood. Gerald testified that Langley
dragged him out of the house literally by the heels with his head banging on the floor and
steps of the porch as he was taken outside to Langley's vehicle. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p. 117).
George testified that he awoke and called the sheriffs office to report a kidnaping,
still unaware Langley claimed to act under any legal authority. The police responded and
cited both Langley and the Lees for assault of each other. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p. 194).
Langley took Gerald to a hospital in Uintah County for examination. A neck brace
was placed on him and a general examination of his bruises was made. Gerald was released
to the custody of Langley who put Gerald in his pickup truck and took him through a terrible
snow storm over dangerous roads back to Grand Junction. Gerald was examined again in a
hospital in Grand Junction. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 123-129).
Gerald bailed out of the jail again by using Robert Thorpe. Gerald testified out of the
presence of the jury that he saw Thorpe hand Langley the cash for bringing him back to Utah
and saw Thorpe execute a receipt for the prisoner and note payment to Langley. (TT, R., p.
1187 at pp. 276-278).
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A trial was subsequently held in the Uintah County Justice Court for all three
Defendants at the same time. Langley was convicted of assault. George and Gerald Lee
were acquitted of any crime. (R. p. 45).
Ranger Insurance Company was the bond surety in Colorado for the Lee bail through
A-l Bail Bonds and Robert Thorpe. (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 1, R., p. 999). Ranger is not
licensed to underwrite bail bonds in Utah. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p. 266).
Plaintiffs brought this action against the Defendants for negligence or reckless
conduct, false imprisonment, and assault. (Complaint, R., p. 3 and R., p. 322). Ranger
Insurance was named a defendant under Utah's law making a bond surety liable for the acts
of an enforcement agent, § 31A-35-601(2), U.C.A.
Other significant events occurred just before and during the trial of note. First, Miles
Langley died so his testimony was presented by deposition. Second, Robert Thorpe failed
to appear for trial. The court denied a motion by the Plaintiffs to have his default entered but
granted the motion in favor of Ranger Insurance Company on their cross-claim for a default
and judgment for failure to appear and defend. (TT. R., p. 1187 at pp. 34 and 227).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This brief looks carefully at the law of arrest in Utah and the public policy behind it.
The Lees recognize that there is a contract provision in the Colorado bail bond contract that
8

allows the bond surety to cause the apprehension of a fugitive. Also, federal case law creates
a general right of the bail bondsman to pursue the fugitive and enforce the contract in other
states. However, other states have considered and held that the right to enforce the bail bond
contract from another state falls to the public policy of the state in which the contract is
sought to be enforced.
An examination of the public policy expressed though the statutes of this state shows
that Miles Langley had no legal authority to arrest Gerald Lee and assault his brother, George
Lee, in Utah. The trial court erred its instruction of the law of arrest to the jury and by
dismissing the false imprisonment claim.
ARGUMENT
A.

INTRODUCTION
This appeal presents extraordinarily interesting legal questions that can safely be said

do not arise very often at all. Plaintiffs believe that the primary cause of the adverse jury
decision was the way the court interpreted and applied legal principles governing the power
to make an arrest. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury in a way that they had no
choice but to conclude the Colorado bounty hunter Miles Langley had legal authority to make
an arrest or apprehension of Gerald Lee in Utah. This brief explains why that fundamental
proposition is simply not true.
9

B.

PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs presented at trial through the evidence, a trial brief, and jury instructions

theories of liability which they believe to be consistent with applicable law. (R., p. 836 and
985). This Court needs to understand the Plaintiffs' theory of the case at trial in order to
appreciate where the trial court went wrong.
Plaintiffs divided facts and legal concepts between each of them at trial because they
had a significant difference in their legal status. Gerald Lee was a fugitive from the state of
Colorado on misdemeanor warrants. George Lee had no pending charge in Colorado and the
entry and assault took place in George's home. Langley, Thorpe, and Ranger Insurance had
no legal authority to be operating in Utah. Consequently, the arrest by Langley was without
lawful authority and, in fact, specifically contrary to Utah law. With no lawful authority, the
seizure of at least Gerald Lee and, arguably, George Lee, by entering his home and knocking
him unconscious, presented a valid claim of false imprisonment. Langley's acts without
justification in law eliminated any defenses to his physical force constituting an assault.
Finally, Plaintiffs relied upon a Utah statute that makes a bond surety responsible for
acts of the bail enforcement bond agent to impute liability to Ranger Insurance Company.
The doctrine of respondeat superior would also apply.

10

C.

FINDING AND APPLYING PUBLIC POLICY
L

The Role of Public Policy

This Court directed in granting the Writ of Certiorari that this appeal focus on whether
enforcement of the bail contract made in Colorado violates the public policy of Utah.
Appellants present here an objective discussion of the law concerning public policy and how
it is to be applied. What follows the discussion of public policy is a specific look at why the
contract at issue did not create arrest powers in Utah.
This Court stated in Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 Ut. 79, 57 P.3d 1007, that public
policy is a term describing the principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the
courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society. Public policy
is a guiding star for the courts in interpreting and applying the law. For example, when an
appellate court has under consideration a statute whose language is uncertain, construction
of that statute is done in a way to promote the public policy expressed by the statute and
thereby achieve the objectives of the legislature. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996).
Put in the context of this appeal, the bail contract at issue is enforceable in Utah
provided its terms are not contrary to Utah public policy. This is not a novel concept and has
arisen many times in Utah law.

11

Examples of public policy affecting the enforceability of a contract include Hawkins
v. Peart, 2001 Ut. 94, 37 P.3d 1062. There, this Court declined to enforce a liability release
of a minor child and an attempt to require a parent to indemnify the releasee. The contractual
release was found unenforceable because it violated public policy of the state of Utah
favoring protection of minors with respect to contractual obligations and removing incentive
to act with reasonable care.
Another example of the voiding of a contract for public policy reasons is Peterson v.
The Sunrider Corporation, 2002 Ut. 43,48 P.3d 918. At issue there was whether a contract
relating to a marketing organization violated the Pyramid Scheme Act, Section 76-6a-l,
U.C.A. This Court recognized that public policy could render a contract unenforceable that
is contrary to law under an analysis of three steps. First, the court must determine what the
terms of the contract are. Second, the court must determine what the statute at issue
prohibits. Third, the court must determine whether the statute or public policy demands that
the contract be deemed unenforceable.
2.

Constitutional Considerations

An analysis of the contract's enforceability in Utah cannot ignore Article I, Section
10 of the United States Constitution which prohibits the states from enacting a law
"impairing the obligations of contract". This clause was long ago determined to not be
12

absolute and there are exceptions to the rule. Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
A primary recognized exception to the impairment of contracts clause is the public
policy of the state in which the contract is carried out. If the state law barring enforceability
of the contract is of a character appropriate to the public purpose behind the legislation, the
contract may be found unenforceable.

Stillman v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity

Association, 343 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2003). See also In re: Walker, 959 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.
1992), where the standard was applied that a state may impair a contract where supported by
significant and legitimate purpose.
These cases tell us that public policy has such great weight in considering contracts
that even the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts falls in light of
legitimate state purposes.
3.

Public Policy of the Law of Arrest in Utah

The apprehension or arrest of persons involves significant constitutional rights found
in the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution governing search
and seizure and Due Process. Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution prohibits
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Section 8 of the same Article recognizes
a right of bail and Section 14 prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. What these Utah
13

and U.S. Constitution provisions make clear is that the public policy of the nation and of
Utah is to recognize and protect the life and liberty of their respective citizens.
Utah had in place when this incident occurred in 1999 a comprehensive set of statutes
governing who may make arrests in Utah and under what circumstances. (See Title 77,
Chapter 7 of the Utah Code at Addendum "D"). (The version in effect in 1999 is included
at Addendum "D"). As a general statement, an arrest can be made by peace officers and by
private persons under certain listed circumstances.
A second source of arrest law is found in Rule 6, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(Addendum "E").
A review of the Utah Criminal Code and Rules of Criminal Procedure shows that
arrests were tightly regulated by law in 1999 in recognition of constitutional rights to
reasonable searches and seizure and in recognition of a general public policy that arrest
power needs to be controlled.
What might be called a sub branch of arrest law in Utah in 1999 is the apprehension
of persons free on bail. That branch of law governing the seizure of persons is also rife with
public policy analyzed in detail next.

14

4.

Utah Legal Framework for Bail Apprehension

The court's attention is drawn to certain specific statutes in the Utah Code that were
in effect at the time of this incident found in Addendum "F". Note that there have been some
revisions to Title 77, Chapter 20 since this incident. All references are to Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, in effect in 1999 when the arrest took place.
Specifically, Section 77-20-8.5(2) provides that bond sureties may arrest a defendant
at any time before exoneration at any place within the state. Note also that subsection (3)
provides that a surety acting under this section is subject to the provisions of Title 53,
Chapter 10, discussed below. (Addendum "G").
While Title 77 governs criminal arrest procedure, Title 53 governs the licensing and
powers of bail enforcement agents. When one turns to Title 53, Chapter 10 as directed by
Section 77-20-8.5, it is immediately observed that this statute is wrong in its reference. The
appropriate chapter of Title 53 is Chapter 11. That chapter, known as the Bail Bond
Recovery Act, gives a comprehensive legal framework for the business operations of bail
bond agents. What jumps out immediately is the fundamental requirement in Section 53-11107 that there are three classes of licenses and no person may act as a bail enforcement agent
or bail recovery agent without holding a Utah license. Sections 53-11-108,109 and 111 go

15

on to set the training and education requirements of bail enforcement agents and bail
recovery agents. (Addendum "G").
Title 53, Chapter 11, imposes requirements relevant to this appeal on bail enforcement
agents in how they do their job. Section 53-11-120 requires a bail enforcement agent upon
request to identify his employer. Section 53-11-122 states that in order to make an arrest a
bail enforcement agent shall so identify himself to the person being arrested after notifying
local police authority.
What these bail statutes tell us is that there is a very definite and comprehensive public
policy by the legislature of how bail apprehensions or arrests are to be done. The legislature
wants trained, qualified people who are licensed to do this kind of activity. The creation of
absolute liability in the bond surety, who is also subject to licensing requirements, for the acts
of the enforcement agent reflect another level of safeguarding this public policy by making
sure bond sureties keep an eye on what the enforcement agents are doing. Finally, the
creation of criminal penalties for violation of any of these bail enforcement laws makes clear
beyond reasonable doubt there is a key public policy at work.
Common sense supports the policies being implemented by the legislature. Those
being apprehended are alleged criminals and there is a tremendous potential for violence.
While the image of a Clint Eastwood bounty hunter makes for great movies, the gunslinger
16

types make for terrible public safety. There is no conceptual stretch in the argument of
appellants that people that make bail arrests ought to comply with the laws intended to make
that activity as safe as possible for the public. The law is clear that no license equals no
arrest by bail agents. In fact, arresting without a license is a crime.

D.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE COLORADO CONTRACT WAS CONTRARY TO
UTAH LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
1.

Title 53 Prohibited Acts by Unlicensed Persons

An examination of Title 53, Chapter 11, shows that there is no legal authority
whatsoever for a person not licensed in Utah to make a bail related arrest. Put simply, there
is no exception for Langley enforcing a Colorado warrant in Utah.
The best that could be said for Langley's legal status would that he acted in making
a citizen's arrest. Section 77-7-3 provides that a private person may arrest another when
there has been a public offense committed or attempted in his presence or when a felony has
been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has committed
it. No fact shows these events happened here. Section 77-7-7 declares that a peace officer
can use force in making an arrest only after the person being arrested flees or forcibly resists
after being informed of the intention to make the arrest. None of these circumstances are
presented by the facts here. Langley was completely outside Utah law.

17

2.

There is No Federal Authority to Make the Utah Arrest

With no state authority for a Colorado bail enforcement agent to make an arrest in
Utah, another potential source of authority for making the arrest is in federal law and was a
major issue at the trial.
In Taylor v. Taintor, 89 U.S. 366 (1872) a person was arrested in Connecticut and
released upon bail. His bail conditions allowed him to go to New York but, while there, he
was arrested and extradited to Maine for a crime. The Connecticut court sought to collect
on the bail bond and the surety attempted to avoid paying claiming that it was impossible to
now bring the fugitive back. The court considered the nature of a bail bond contract and said
in dicta that the bond principal or defendant is regarded as having been delivered by the state
to the custody of the surety. The surety retains common law power under the bond contract
to pursue the defendant into another state for return to the court, so there was no legal
impossibility to excuse paying the bond.
An examination of the trial exhibits shows that the Ranger Insurance Company bond
forms completed in connection with the Gerald Lee bail recite a contract right to apprehend
Lee. (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 2, at R., p. 999 in Addendum "H").
What the trial court did conceptually is recognize the contract right to apprehend
Gerald Lee and then apply Taylor v. Taintor to say that Langley could pursue Lee into Utah
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to enforce that contract right of apprehension. In short, the trial judge found the bail contract
trumps Utah statutes to the contrary.
The trial court ruled early on in the trial that the Utah licensing statute would not be
used to determine whether Langley had authority to arrest. (TT, R., p. 1187 at 4-7, 9-12).
This early ruling, before any evidence was presented, effectively mortally wounded the
Plaintiffs' theory of the case, described above. Consistent with that ruling, Jury Instructions
no. 25 and 26 were given over the objection of the plaintiff s counsel. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp.
291,238,291 -292). Jury instructions proffered by the Plaintiffs were rejected. (Addendum
T \ R., pp. 901-906).
The instructions given essentially told the jury that the law was that if Ranger
Insurance delegated authority to apprehend to Miles Langley, Langley had the power to
lawfully make an arrest. (R., pp. 1028, 1029 in Addendum "I"). What the court did, in
essence, was apply its understanding of Taylor v. Taintor to the effect that if Gerald Lee had
entered a contract with the surety then the only issue was whether the surety had authorized
Langley to go get Lee. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 215-217).
This view by the court of the authority to arrest also caused the court to dismiss the
claim for false imprisonment brought by both Plaintiffs. (TT,R.,p. 1187 at 213-216). Lees
could not be subject to false arrest/imprisonment by one having arrest authority.
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There really is no doubt that Miles Langley did not have the power to arrest. As
explained above, Utah has a comprehensive set of statutes in place which govern the
licensing of a bail enforcement agent and even make it a Class A Misdemeanor to act as a
bail enforcement agent without a license in Utah. Appellants are in a very difficult position
because they are being asked to prove a negative. That is, when the court dismissed
application of Title 53, it shifts conceptually the burden onto the plaintiff to show that there
is no bar to an out-of-state person coming into Utah and making a bail arrest. Instead, the
District Court should have applied the plain language of Title 53 and required Langley to
have a license consistent with public policy of this state to regulate bail enforcement.
Taylor v. Taintor does not provide a refuge for defendants. That case was decided in
the absence of any express statutes which were put into play in the decision. Instead, that
case can be read as having said in dicta there is a common law right of bail bondsman to
pursue fugitives into other states to enforce the bail contract.
That Taylor does not have application here is found by looking at several cases from
other states. In Walker v. Commonwealth, 111 S.W.3d 596 (KY. 2004) the court considered
the conviction of a bond enforcement agent from Ohio making an arrest in Kentucky without
a warrant. The bondsman raised Taylor v. Taintor as a defense saying he had the right to
come into Kentucky to make the arrest for the Ohio court. The Kentucky court rejected the
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argument completely by finding that the Kentucky statute prohibiting the arrest of persons
by bondsman without a warrant abolished the common law rule of Taylor. Similarly, the
Utah Title 53 would abolish the Taylor common law rule.
In McFarland v. State, 666 N. W.2d 631 (Iowa App. 2003), a bounty hunter from Iowa
made an arrest in Iowa out of which he was charged with assaulting the subject fugitive. The
bounty hunter raised as a defense the Taylor case pointing out that the dicta in that case
creates common law that the fugitive can be pursued just about anywhere and the bounty
hunter may break and enter his home for that purpose. The Iowa court correctly pointed out
that the Taylor case lends no support whatsoever for the proposition a bounty hunter has
some authority to break into the home of an innocent party and assault him or her. Similarly,
the Taylor case would give no authority for Langley to enter the home of George Lee and
assault him while apprehending Gerald Lee.
In Green v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222 (Texas App. 1992), a defendant in a murder case
raised Taylor v. Taintor in support of a mistake of law defense. The Texas court pointed out
that Texas statutes governing sureties who seek to apprehend principals had replaced the
common law of Taylor. Again, Utah has adopted Title 53 which also abrogates the
application of Taylor.
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In Johnson v. County ofKittitas, 11 P.3d 862 (Wash. App. 2001), the court considered
a bail bondsman who seized a defendant simply because the bondsman felt threatened that
the defendant may skip on the bond. The bondsman relied on Taylor v. Taintor to argue that
a surety had a right to pick up the subject as they believed necessary to protect the bond
contract. The court rejected the argument stating, as did the other states, that the adoption
of a Washington state statute concerning the authority of a bail bondsman supplanted the
common law rule of Taylor v. Taintor.
A case decided after this appeal was briefed to the Utah Court of Appeals has some
significance here. In State v. Burhans, 89 P.3d 269 (Kan. 2004), the court considered the
conviction of a bail bondsman of assault and trespass under facts strikingly similar to those
presented here. Burhans did not involve an out of state bondsman but a local bondsman that
entered the home of a relative of the fugitive on false pretenses to make a bail arrest and a
fight ensued. The Kansas Supreme Court made an exhaustive analysis of the right (privilege)
of a bail bondsman to enforce the bail contract and also considered the rule of Taylor v.
Taintor. The Kansas court decided that even though the bail contract created a right to
pursue the fugitive, that right of pursuit ended where it ran into other legal principles. Here,
the court found the contract does not authorize entry to the residence of a third party in which
the fugitive does not reside and entry must be by consent not induced by misrepresentation.
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Putting the case law from other states concerning the right to enforce the bail contract
into the language of this appeal, all of these other states have found that when the bail
contract runs into state statutes these statutes and the public policy of the state override the
federal common law.
3.

The District Court Erred in Applying the Law

No legal authority existed for Miles Langley to come into Utah and arrest Gerald Lee
much less enter the home and assault George Lee. Utah has adopted an absolute requirement
that those who seek to enforce bail bonds must have a license to do so after qualifying under
Title 53, Chapter 11. With no offense committed in the presence of Langley in Utah, there
was no right of citizen's arrest. The old federal common law right of a bail bondsman to
pursue a fugitive in another state was eliminated by the adoption of Title 53.
With all of the predicate legal principles in mind, the reversible error of the district
court can be brought into sharp focus. Plaintiffs' theory of the case under Utah law was that
Langley had no legal authority to be in Utah making an arrest therefore he could be liable
for false imprisonment through false arrest, he could be liable for assault because he was
using force in a situation in which he had no right to assert force, and he could be liable for
negligence or reckless endangerment because he was purporting to carry out a duty without
legal authority. By holding that there was a common law right of interstate apprehension
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pursuant to the contract documents, the trial court was wrong on the law and instructed the
jury wrong when it said all they had to do to find lawful arrest authority was to find the
contract authorized Langley to act for Ranger Insurance and Robert Thorpe.
There is no known authority for the proposition that parties can get together in one
state and contract away the public policy and statutes of another state, yet that is what the
court allowed in this trial. The law applied by the trial court simply gave away the public
policy of the state that there should be order to bail arrests, that bail bondsmen should be
trained and licensed, and that bail sureties should be licensed in Utah. In effect, the court's
instruction to the jury said that what the Utah legislature does has no significance.
Returning to the three part test of this court stated in Peterson v. The Sunrider
Corporation, there is no issue as to what the terms of the contract are. There is no question
as to what Title 53 prohibits. Finally, the conflict between the right to enforce the contract
and the specific statutes requiring licensing and training demand that the contract be found
to be unenforceable by an unlicensed person in Utah.
No stretch of logic is necessary to conclude that if the jury had been properly
instructed that Langley had no legal authority to be in Utah, that they could have found
favorable for the Plaintiffs. A new trial with the jury instructed consistent with Utah law is
justified.
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E.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
The elements of false imprisonment by false arrest were given long ago in Hepworth

v. Covey Bros. Amusement Company, 91 P.2d 507 (Utah 1939). The court stated there that
false imprisonment by false arrest occurs when any exercise of force, or express or implied
threat of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to
remain where he does not wish to remain or go where he does not wish to go, is an
imprisonment. These foundational elements were elaborated upon in McFarland v. Skaggs
Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), wherein the court said that a lawful arrest must
be done in accordance with "statutory dictates".
Put simply, an arrest in Utah is a false arrest or false imprisonment where there is no
specific authority to make the arrest.
As explained in the preceding section, Miles Langley had no authority to arrest Gerald
Lee in Utah. Certainly, even if there was some authority found in the law to arrest Gerald
Lee, Langley is not given any authority to falsely imprison George Lee in his own home. It
is a question of fact that the jury could have found that George Lee, by exercise of force of
Miles Langley, was deprived of his liberty or compelled to remain by the force.
The error of the trial court was to not even let the jury consider that false
imprisonment claim through finding Miles Langley had a right to act under the common law
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surrounding the bail bond contract. The district court was wrong on the law completely.
Instead of instructing the jury that if Miles Langley was found to be acting within the
contract there was legal authority, the jury should have been instructed that Langley had no
authority to act in Utah and the Defendants needed to show a justification for force or
detention.
This Court should reverse the trial court and remand for trial on the claim of false
imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
If one steps back and takes an objective look at the big picture of all of this, what
emerges is a tale of complete disregard for law, Due Process, statutes, public policy, and
common sense. The Lees have never said anything other than Gerald should have shown up
for his court dates in Colorado. However, what resulted was a wild west bounty hunter story
in which state sovereignty and carefully crafted public policy was thrown to the wind.
Ranger Insurance Company could have avoided all of this simply by hiring a licensed Utah
bail enforcement agent to deliver Gerald Lee to Colorado. The very problem which the Utah
legislature tried to avoid happened because nobody followed the law. A melee with resulting
physical injury took place with the Colorado defendants making a profit off the bail bond
claiming no responsibility.
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The trial court holding that Utah statutes do not apply to a contract made in another
state has considerable significance. Affirming the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals
would be a clear message to a great variety of professions that Utah takes a minority position
on the significance of its public policy. Created is a legal loophole to licensing requirements
of any vocation so long as you agree to perform the work in Utah in a contract made in
another place. This is not idle speculation. Currently before the Utah Court of Appeals is
an appeal of multiple plaintiffs of a dismissal of dozens of asbestos claims because medical
conclusions were made by a physician in Utah not licensed in Utah. See Allred v. AC and
S, Inc., et al, Docket No. 20050829-CA. The point being made here is if the gates to
unlicensed activity are opened, the flood is ready to come to Utah. This court should stand
holding the gate of state sovereignty expressed through public policy against that flood.
This Court is respectfully requested to hold as follows:
1.

That under a standard of correctness the Eighth District Court erred in applying

a federal common law right under the bail bond contract for a Colorado bail recovery agent
to come into Utah and arrest and assault Gerald Lee and his innocent brother, thereby giving
the jury a legal justification for Langley's assault on the Lees. The negligence and assault
claims should be retried.
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2,

Plaintiffs request this Court remand the case under a standard of correctness

because the Eighth District Court committed reversible error by dismissing the false
imprisonment by false arrest claim under a finding that there was a common law right for
enforcement agent Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee in Utah. Fact questions remain as to
whether George Lee had been falsely imprisoned, also.
Taking all of the errors into account, this Court is respectfully requested to remand
the case to the Eighth District Court for a new trial.
DATED this 30th day of December, 2005.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGOKyX SANDERS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees
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JURISDICTION
1.Jurisdiction is proper under U.R.S.
78-12-29
PARTIES
2. a. Plaintiff Georgee M. Lee has had legal residence at 1434 E. 4500 S
Vernal,Utah since October 1998.
b. Plaintiff Gerald L. Lee has had legal residence at 2281 S. 4500 S.
Vernal,Utah since May,1998.
2.a. Defendant Miles Walter Langleys^last known -ddress was 1264 Grand
Avenue Delta,Colorado 81416 and was employed part time as a bounty hunter
by A-1 Bail Bonds225 W. Grand Avenue Grand Junction Colorado.
*.Defendant Robert P.Thorpe A-1 Bail Bonds 225 W.Grand Avenue
Grand Junction,Colorado.Where he is a Bailbondsman.
c.Defendant Ranger Insurance Co.is a bond surety company P.O.Box
2807 Houston,Texas 77252-2807.
FACTS
4.Both plaintiffs were at1434E.4500 S. Vernal,Utah
5.Plaintiff Gerald Lee was unemploye at the tia~ ^nd had been seeking
imployment.
6.At approximately 2:00 P.M.April 2,1999. Defendant Miles Walter
Langley,being an agent working for A-1 Bail Bonds,and Ranger Insurance,
entered the Vernal,Utah area of Uintah County 'with the explicit purpose
of arresting and returning plaintiff Gerald Lee to Colorado on supposed
felony warrants.
7.At approximately 2:30 P.M. April 2,1999. Defendant Miles Walter
La^fcgley approached the residence at 1434 E.4500 S. representing himself
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a s Miles Langley of C h r i s t i a n B r o s . C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. t o p l a i n t i f f
George M. Lee, gained e n t r y t o t h e r e s i d e n c e . Langley t o l d p l a i n t i f f
George M. Lee t h a t he wanted t o h i r e p l a i n t i f f Gerald L.Lee to work
f o r h i s company. Upon b e i n g i n t r o d u c e d t o p l a i n t i f f Gerald L. Lee
d e f e n d a n t M i l e s Walter Langley grabbed Gerald L.Lee around the neck
and s t r u c k him i n t h e head with banc.cuffs.
3*--lc..v.ici u- George M.Lee attempted t o s t o p t h e a t t a c k on Gerald L.
Lee,and was s t r u c k i n t h e mouth and n o s e , w i t h Langleys elbow then f i s t ,
which r e n d e r e d p l a i n t i f f George M.Lee u n c o n s c i o u s and s e r i o u s l y b l e e d i n g
on t h e f l o o r *
9.Defendant M i l e s Walter Langley drug p l a i n t i f f Gerald L.Lee from
t h e r e s i d e n c e , l e a v i n g p l a i n t i f f George M.Lee s t i l l unconscious and
b l e e d i n g on t h e f l o o r .
TO.Defendant M i l e s / a l t . , r Langley a t no time when he was i n t h e
r e s i d e n c e i d e n t i f i e d h i m s e l f as a bounty h u n t e r , b o n d enforcement a g e n t ,
o r a n y t h i n g t o do with a bond agency*
LEGAL CLAIMS
The d e f e n d a n t s a c t i o n s w e r e / a r e a v i o l a t i o n of law under U.B.S.#
7 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 A s s a u l t and B a t t e r y
7 6 - 5 - 3 0 2 Kidnap
7 6 - 5 - 1 1 2 R e c k l e s s Sndangerment
31A-35-601 Acts and Conduce oi B a i l Bond Agents
Claims n o t l i m i t e d t o above s t a t u t e s .
R e l i e f Requested
1 . P l a i n t i f f s c o s t s for t h i s action*
2 . T r i a l by j u r y on a l l i s s u e s t r i a b l e by j u r y .
3.Damages i n t h e amount of
Compensatory ft 500fOOP
Per Defendant
Punitive
ft
500,000
Per Defendant

Respectfully^Submitted^)
George MLee
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Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne.
THORNE, Judge:
fl
George and Gerald Lee sued Miles Langley, Robert Thorpe, and
Ranger Insurance Co. for false imprisonment, assault, and
negligent or reckless endangerment. The trial court dismissed
the false imprisonment claims and the jury found for the
defendants on the other claims. The Lees appeal various trial
court rulings. W$ affirm.
BACKGROUND
\2
In 1998, Gerald Lee was twice arrested in Colorado for
driving offenses including driving under the influence of
alcohol. To obtain bail, Gerald purchased two bail bonds from A1 Bail Bonds (A-l), a Colorado bail bonding agency owned by
Robert P. Thorpe. For each bond, Gerald entered into an
identical Bail Bond Application and Contract (collectively the
bail contract) with Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger), a Texas
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bail bond surety that insured the bonds.
contained the following provisions:

The bail contract

1. Ranger shall have control and
jurisdiction over me during the term for
which my bail bond(s) is executed and shall
have the right to apprehend and surrender me
to the proper officials at any time for
violation of my bail bond(s) obligations to
the Court and Ranger as provided by law.
2. It is understood and agreed that any one
of the following actions by me shall
constitute a breach of my obligations to
Ranger and that Ranger and/or its Agent shall
have the right to forthwith apprehend and
surrender me in exoneration of my bail
bond(s):
a. If I depart the jurisdiction of the
court without written consent of the
court and Ranger or its Agent.
3. If I depart the jurisdiction of the Court
wherein my bail bond(s) is posted by Ranger
for any reason, and I am captured by Ranger
and/or its Agent . . . in a State other than
the one in which my bail bond(s) is posted, I
hereby agree to voluntarily return to the
State of original jurisdiction, and I hereby
waive extradition proceedings and further
consent to the application of such reasonable
force as may be necessary to effect such
return.
Using the bonds, Gerald posted bail and was released from state
custody.
1|3
Gerald violated the terms of his bail by failing to appear
for court hearings and by leaving Colorado for Utah. A-1 hired
Miles Langley to apprehend Gerald.1 Langley was licensed as a
1. Whether A-1 hired Langley was one of many contested issues at
trial. As the primary question in this case involves the
dismissal of the Lees1 false imprisonment claims, we summarize
the factual background of this case using the Lees' version of
events. See Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378,115, 102 P.3d 774
("On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the facts as they
are alleged in the complaint. We accept the factual allegations
in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences
(continued...)

A-8
20040308-CA

2

bail recovery agent in Colorado, but not in Utah. Suspecting
that Gerald was in Utah, Langley verified that a Colorado arrest
warrant existed for Gerald and proceeded to Utah to apprehend
him. Langley checked in with the Vernal County Sheriff and
obtained information that Gerald could be located at his brother
George's home in Naples, Utah. Langley proceeded to Naples,
where he checked in with Naples police and informed them of his
intentions.
14
Langley went to George's home, where he obtained permission
to enter the home by stating that he represented someone who was
interested in employing Gerald as a mechanic. At some point
Langley shook Gerald's hand, and while he did so he placed
handcuffs on Gerald. An altercation broke out between Langley,
Gerald, and George, resulting in physical injury to both Gerald
and George. Langley took custody of Gerald and removed him from
the home to his vehicle, leaving George unconscious on the floor.
George awoke and called the police, who arrived while Langley and
Gerald were still at the scene. The police issued assault
citations to each of the three parties, but required Gerald to
accompany Langley or face arrest by them. Langley took custody
of Gerald, took him to a Uintah County hospital for examination,
and ultimately returned him to Colorado.
t5
The Lees sued Langley, Thorpe, and Ranger for assault and
battery, reckless endangerment, and kidnap. The trial court
allowed the Lees to present their kidnapping claim to the jury as
a claim for false imprisonment, but granted a defense motion for
directed verdict on that claim after the close of the Lees' case
in chief. The jury ultimately determined that Langley did not
assault or recklessly endanger the Lees, rendering the Lees'
agency-based claims against Thorpe and Ranger moot. The Lees
appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
%6 The Lees challenge the trial court's jury instructions
pertaining to the law of arrest. "'Whether a jury instruction
correctly states the law presents a question of law which we
review for correctness.'" Martinez v. Wells. 2004 UT App 43,1l4,
88 P.3d 343 (quoting State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118,111, 62
P.3d 444).

1. (...continued)
to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff." (quotations and citation omitted)).
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f7
The Lees argue that the trial court erred in granting a
directed verdict on their false imprisonment claims. "We review
a directed verdict under the same standard employed by the trial
court." Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co.. 2004 UT
227,113, 95 P.3d 1171 (quotations and citations omitted). A
directed verdict is appropriate "'only if, examining all evidence
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving
party's favor.'" Id. (quoting Five F, L.L.C. v. Heritage Sav.
Bank, 2003 UT App 373,1l2, 81 P.3d 105).
58
The Lees also argue that the trial court erred when it
refused to enter default against Thorpe for failing to appear at
trial. We review a trial court's decisions on default under an
abuse of discretion standard. Cf. Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75,59,
11 P.3d 277 ("[A] trial court has broad discretion in deciding
whether to set aside a default judgment.").
%9
Finally, the Lees challenge two of the trial court's
evidentiary rulings. "Trial courts are afforded broad discretion
in determining the admissibility of evidence; thus we will not
disturb a trial court's ruling whether to admit or exclude
evidence absent an abuse of discretion." Vigil v. Division of
Child & Family Servs., 2005 UT App 43,^8, 107 P.3d 716.
ANALYSIS
I.

Jury Instructions

^10 The Lees first argue that the trial court incorrectly
instructed the jury on the law of arrest. According to the Lees,
Langley had no legal authority to arrest Gerald Lee. We
disagree. Langley's authority to arrest Lee arose from the bail
contract, and that authority existed even if its exercise by
Langley, an unlicensed bail enforcement agent, was illegal. Cf.
Moslev v. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149, 152 (1969)
(stating that an unlicensed well driller would be entitled to
retain personal property obtained in payment on drilling
contract, even though contract was void due to driller's lack of
license).
5ll Arrests by bail sureties are addressed in Utah Code section
77-20-8.5. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-8.5 (2003). That statute,
as it existed at the time of Langley's arrest of Gerald Lee,
stated that "[f]or the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the
sureties may arrest him at any time before they are finally
exonerated and at any place within the state." Id. § 77-208.5(2) (1999). However, the statute further provided that "[a]
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surety acting under this section is subject to the provisions of
Title 53, Chapter [11], Bail Bond Recovery,« Jd^ § 77-20-8.5(3).
112 Utah's Bail Bond Recovery Act (the Act) , see Utah Code Ann.
§§ 53-11-101 to -124 (2002) ,2 sets up a licensing scheme for bail
enforcement agents and provides that a person may not "act or
assume to act as, or represent himself to be, a licensee unless
he is licensed!.]" Id. § 53-11-107(2). The act of arresting a
person upon a bail bond without possessing a Utah bail
enforcement agent's license is a class A misdemeanor. See id.
§ 53-11-124 (2002); State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 88,11l,7, 67
P.3d 1050 (affirming convictions under the Act where defendant
"was not licensed as a Bail Recovery Agent or Bail Enforcement
Agent, as required under the Act"). It is undisputed for
purposes of this appeal that Langley did not possess a Utah
license pursuant to the Act.
113 In order for a statute to render an arrest lawful, the
arrest "must be effected in accordance with statutory dictates."
McFarland v. Skaaas Cos.. 678 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1984). Because
Langley was unlicensed in Utah, his arrest of Lee was illegal
under the Act and therefore not authorized by section 77-20-8.5.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-8.5(3) (1999).
114 Despite this lack of statutory authority, the trial court
properly instructed the jury that Langley had "the power to
lawfully make an arrest" if it found that Langley was acting on
Ranger's behalf. Lee contracted with Ranger to allow Ranger "to
apprehend and surrender [him] to the proper officials at any time
for violation of [his] bail bond(s) obligations." Lee's
contractual submission to Ranger's authority to apprehend him,
which was not limited in geographical scope and expressly
contemplated Lee's apprehension outside of Colorado, did not
condition Ranger's arrest authority on the state licensing status
of any eventual enforcement agent.
Jl5 While the bail contract would not relieve Langley from
criminal liability under the Act, it does preclude Lee from
arguing in this civil action that Ranger--and by extension
Langley--had no authority to apprehend him in Utah. Cf. Snyder
v, Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that when
a conflict arises between parties to a contract regarding the
subject matter of that contract, "the contractual relationship
controls, and parties are not permitted to assert actions in tort
in an attempt to circumvent the bargain they agreed upon"). Lee
2. The Act has not been amended in any relevant way since the
date of Lee's arrest. We cite to the most current version for
convenience.
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personally and expressly authorized his apprehension by Ranger or
its agent. Ranger relied on that authority to secure Lee's
initial release from custody, and Langley relied on that
authority to effectuate Lee's arrest. Under these circumstances,
the trial court properly instructed the jury that Langley had the
authority to arrest Lee if he was acting upon Ranger's
delegation. This is particularly so when it is uncontested that
Langley would have had statutory authority to arrest Lee but for
his lack of a license. See also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 36 at 226 (5th ed. 1984)
(licensing statutes create no liability if the actor is competent
but unlicensed).
Kl6 The only potential error we can identify in the jury
instructions involves the trial court's use of the legally
significant word "arrest" rather than the contractual term
"apprehend." Arrest implies the sanction of the state in a way
that apprehend may not, and there may be certain privileges or
defenses available to a party acting under statutory arrest
authority that are not available to one merely acting under
contract. However, the Lees do not argue that this distinction
had any reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury's verdict,
nor do we see any such likelihood. Accordingly, any misuse of
the word arrest in the jury instructions is at most harmless
error. See Covey y. Covey. 2003 UT App 380,f21, 80 P.3d 553
("'Harmless error is defined as an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.'" (citation and alteration omitted)).
^17 We conclude that Gerald Lee's express contractual agreement
authorized Ranger or its agent to apprehend him and bars him from
complaining that the apprehension in fact occurred. Accordingly,
for purposes of this tort action, the trial court properly
instructed the jury that Langley's arrest of Lee was lawful so
long as it was on behalf of Ranger. Lee has alleged no other
error in the jury instructions.
II.

Directed Verdict

ll8 The Lees further argue that the trial court erred in
granting a directed verdict against each of their claims for
false imprisonment. We disagree.
fl9 "False imprisonment is an act 'intending to confine the
other . . . within boundaries fixed by the actor,' which 'results
in such a confinement' while 'the other is conscious of the
confinement or is harmed by it.'" Tiede v. State. 915 P.2d 500,
503 n.4 (Utah 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 35 (1965)). "[F]alse imprisonment occurs
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whenever there is an unlawful detention or restraint of another
against his will." Mildon v. Bvbee, 13 Utah 2d 400# 375 P.2d
458, 459 (1962).
120 We have already concluded that Langley's apprehension of
Gerald Lee was lawful so long as Langley was acting as an agent
of Ranger. The Lees asserted that Langley was Ranger's agent in
their complaint, and Langley's deposition testimony further
established at trial that he was acting pursuant to Gerald Lee's
contract with Ranger. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in concluding that Gerald Lee's detention was lawful and that his
claim for false imprisonment could not proceed.3
121 The sole basis for George Lee's false imprisonment claim is
his allegation that Langley knocked him unconscious during their
struggle. Lee presents no authority for his proposition that a
claim for false imprisonment arises any time an altercation
results in unconsciousness. Even assuming that unconsciousness
can be equated with confinement, Lee presented no evidence that
Langley intended to confine him, as required to make out a claim
of false imprisonment. See Tiede, 915 P.2d at 503 n.4. Under
these circumstances, the trial court acted properly when it
directed a verdict on George Lee's false imprisonment claim and
allowed him to seek damages from the altercation under his other
theories of assault and endangerment.
III.

Failure to Enter Default and Evidentiary Rulings

122 The Lees1 remaining arguments challenge the trial court's
refusal to enter default against Thorpe, its exclusion of
Langley's prior admission that he was not licensed as a bail
bondsman in Utah, and its exclusion of a receipt signed by Thorpe
that evidenced Thorpe's hiring of Langley. We determine that
these alleged errors amount to, at most, harmless error.

3. Alternatively, the bail contract manifests Lee's consent to
being apprehended, which necessarily includes the concepts of
confinement, detention, and restraint. No intentional*tort will
lie where the plaintiff consents to otherwise tortious activity.
See Lounsburv v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 192-196 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (discussing intentional tort of battery as requiring a lack
of consent). While we are aware that there might be
circumstances under which public policy precludes consent as a
tort defense, this case does not present such circumstances.
Bail contracts do not violate public policy; to the contrary,
they have become integral to the efficient administration of our
criminal justice system.
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1[23 An error is harmless when "there is no reasonable likelihood
that it affected the outcome of the case.11 Price v. Armour. 949
P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) . There appears to have been no
dispute in this case that Langley was licensed as a bail agent in
Colorado, but not in Utah. Even if there was a factual dispute
as to this issue, we have determined that Langley1 s Utah
licensure status was irrelevant to the Lees' tort claims against
him. We are unconvinced that any error in the exclusion of this
evidence resulted in a reasonable likelihood of a different
outcome for the Lees. Accordingly, any error is harmless.
^24 The Lee's remaining arguments address issues relating to
Thorpe and Ranger's vicarious liability for the actions of
Langley. All of the Lees' tort claims against Langley were
rejected either by the trial court or by the jury, and we have
affirmed those decisions on appeal. Vicarious liability does not
exist apart from the liability of some putative primary
tortfeasor, in this case Langley. See Mann v. Wadsworth, 776
P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[S]ince Watkiss &
Campbell's liability under respondeat superior is vicarious, it
does not exist apart from Wadsworth's liability. The jury held
Wadsworth not liable, and the same result must, therefore, also
obtain for Watkiss & Campbell."). Accordingly, because the Lees
could not establish liability against Langley, they could not
establish vicarious liability against Thorpe or Ranger as a
matter of law. Any error in the trial court's refusal to default
Thorpe4 or admit the receipt signed by Thorpe into evidence
therefore could not have been reasonably likely to affect the
outcome of the proceeding.

4. "There is an important distinction between a default and a
default judgment [,]" and "the entry of a default does not
automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default judgment for the
damages claimed in the complaint.• Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope
SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). "To enter a default
judgment for unliquidated damages, a judge must review the
complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid claim
for relief, and award damages in an amount that is supported by
some valid evidence." Id. In this case, even if Thorpe had been
defaulted, the Lees' complaint does not "state a valid claim for
relief" against him in light of the jury's verdict in favor of
his alleged agent, Langley. Id. Accordingly, no judgment would
ever have been entered against Thorpe even if he had been
defaulted.
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CONCLUSION
125 The trial court properly concluded that Lee could not
dispute Langley's authority to arrest him under the bail contract
despite Langley's lack of a Utah bail enforcement agent license.
The trial court also properly dismissed both George and Gerald
Lee's claims for false imprisonment. The Lees' other claims of
error constitute, at most, harmless error.
f26

Accordingly, we affirm.

H27

I CONCUR:
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BAIL BOND UNDERWRITING AGREEMENT
THIS; AGREEMENT entered into this 11thof March, 1998, by and between RANGER
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation duly licensed and authorized to issue surety
bail bond powers of attorney in all bail states (hereinafter "RIC or "Company*), North American
Bail Bond Services (hereinafter "General Agent") and Robert Paul Thorpe and Maria Elizabeth
Thorpe dba.A-1 Bait Bonds (hereinafter "Agent" or "Bail Agent").
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the promises set forth hereinafter, the parties hereto
agree as follows;
1.
DEFINITIONS.
As used herein, the terms "Company" and/or "RIC" shall be
interchangeable and refer to RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY or its designee. As used
hereinafter! unless otherwise indicated the terms "Bail Agent" and "Agent" shall be
interchangeable. As used herein, the terms "bail bond/' •'undertaking," "bond," and "power of
attorney" shall be interchangeable unless otherwise indicated.
2.
GENERAL PURPOSES. Subject to the following terms and conditions, company
shall supply surety bail bonds to Agent. Agent shall at all times hereunder remain a duly licensed
and qualified Bail Agent in Colorado as required by law. Agent may solicit and execute bonds in
any area in:which it Is duly licensed, has been Issued a qualifying power and been duly appointed
by Company,
3.
RELATION OF COMPANY, GENERAL AGENT AND AGENT.
The relation of
Company ^nd Agent Is that of principal and independent contractor. Agent shall have exclusive
control ov4r his retail bail business, shall set his/her own working hours, and shall retain or
discharge Employees or independent contractors In Agent's sole discretion. Agent shall not use
the name <pf Company in any advertising for in any manner which induces a belief that Agent is
an employee of, or in any way associated with Company other than Company supplying bonds to
Agent in a; wholesale manner. Agent shall receive no wages, salaries, or other compensation
from Company. Agent is solely responsible for seeking out and obtaining any and all specialized
knowledgej and skills necessary in his or her professional function, and is similarly solely
responsible for the proper screening, selection and hiring of all employees and/or independent
contractors retained by Agent. Unless Company otherwise notifies Agent, General Agent will act
as Company's authorized representative with regard to this contract and Agent will perform its
contractual obligations with Company through General Agent. Also, unless Company otherwise
notifies Agent, General Agent will have the same rights of indemnification as Company as
specified ih this Agreement.
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4.
POWERS OF ATTORNEY. Company, through General Agent, shall furnish Agent
with bail bond Powers of Attorney in such numbers, denominations and at such times as
Company shall determine. Agent shall not allow any unlicensed or unauthorized person to
possess such Powers of Attorney, and upon receipt of Powers shall be solely responsible for
such Powers. Whenever demanded by Company or General Agent, Agent shall immediately
surrender or deliver to Company or its authorized representative any and all unused Powers or
Attorney. Should any Powers of Attorney be unaccounted for, stolen, or otherwise lost, Agent
shall report same to Company as unaccounted for, stolen or lost and unless otherwise directed by
Company, shall within seven (7) days, of obtaining knowledge of such deficiency, make full
premium remittance as herein described, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of each such
Power of Attorney by Agent.
5.
REGULATION OF BOND EXECUTIONS. Company may, at its discretion, direct
Agent to rpfrain from executing, issuing or renewing Powers of Attorney on behalf of any
defendant/bond principal. Company may, in its discretion, set a maximum single undertaking
amount limit for Agent, and Agent agrees he will not issue any bond in excess of said limit without
first obtaining the express approval of Company of each such bond.
6.
BOND COLLATERAL.
Agent shall solicit, collect, protect, insure, return, apply,
deliver to (pompany and/or otherwise deal with such collateral, be it real or personal property,
currency, securities or any other thing of value, as Company shall authorize and/or direct from
time to timh or as is required to protect the interests of Company hereunder. Company shall be
named co-trustee on any build up fund/reserve account, indemnity account, client trust fund or
collateral account, and is the intended beneficiary thereof. All cash collateral taken on Ranger
bonds will be held in a separate cash collateral account and not be commingled with other surety
funds. Company shall be entitled to inspect immediately all collateral taken and all such accounts
of Agent, .along with any general business account(s), upon request by an authorized
representative of Company. Company may, in its discretion, direct Agent to immediately deliver
any and all collateral of any sort taken by Agent at any time as bond security to Company,
identified by bond number, indemnitor and principal, to be held in trust by Company until released
to Agent or directly7 to the party who gave such collateral, and Company shall be the beneficiary
of same. Agent will hold such collateral as a fiduciary in a manner which complies with all laws
and administrative regulations of this state, and shall indemnify and hold Company harmless as
to any action regarding the taking, maintenance or return of such collateral. Agent will provide
collateral indemnitor with a properly completed collateral receipt for each bail bond issued. The
signed collateral receipt given to the Indemnitor will show 'Personal indemnification only, no
physical collateral, no cash" if no collateral is taken. Receipt will only be the receipt form provided
by Company as part of Power of Attorney form, Where Company receipt form is not allowed by
law, Agent'will use only Company approved form, which complies with state law.
7.
BOND PREMIUM RATES, BOND COSTS, COLLECTION, AND REMITTANCES.
Company jshall have the right to fix and change bond premium rates to be charged the public.
Any premium rate increase, or related fee increase to the public shall be collected by Agent in
accord herewith and remitted to Company as herein provided. With respect to bond premiums
the following shall aoply:
2
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(a)
Unless otherwise authorized and/or directed by Company, and without
regard to premium credit extended to customers, Agent shall remit to Company within seven (7)
days of execution of each bond all premiums collected for the Company by the agent.
(b)
The Agent's compensation shall be as may be agreed upon between the
Agent 8nd the General Agent per the attached "Schedule of Charges.*1
8.
AGENT DUTIES WITH REGARD TO BOND PRINCIPALS. Agent shall be solely
responsible for the negotiating, underwriting, securing and posting of bail bonds issued to secure
the release!fromcustody of criminal defendants, and for the apprehension, holding, movement,
arrest, extradition and/or surrender of errant bond principals; court appearances of bond
principals; and/or any and all other dealing with bond principals; all such actions and dealings by
Agent shall!be conducted properly and lawfully in compliance with all laws, statutes, regulations
and pruderit business practices utilized in the bail bond business. Agent shall be solely
responsible' for any damages arising from, occasioned by, or in the course of an arrest or
apprehension, holding movement, extradition and/or surrender of bond principals. Should any
damages or legal action for damages arise from Agent's actions in the absence of written consent
from Company, Agents contract collateral build up funds and/or indemnity funds shall be
available for payment of any damages, defenses, or attorney's fees, and Agent shall hold
Company free and harmless from any and all damages with respect to the handling,
apprehension, arrest or surrender of any bond principal, or any other aspect of his or her bail
bond business transactions. Agent shall exercise extreme care in all respects with regard to
apprehension, arrest, or surrender of any bond principal, and shall exercise the utmost care and
caution in the selection of person to assist Agent in accomplishing these various tasks.
9.
AGENTS DUTIES WITH REGARD TO BOND ADMINISTRATION. Agent
shall be solely responsible for the satisfaction of bond forfeitures; investigation of bond principals
and prospective bond principals; negotiation, settlement and/or satisfaction of claims against
Agent by bond principals, courts and/or others; and/or any and all other matters of bond
administration hereunder. Agent shall make, or cause to be made, any and all necessary and
warranted legal motions to preserve, reinstate and exonerate bonds, at Agent's sole expense.
Agent shall[timely pay any and all cost assessments imposed by any court for bond exoneration,
and shall be responsible for the payment of any and all judgments entered on bonds supplies by
Company, j Agent shall not bring legal action of any sort in the name of the Company or its
designee wjthout the prior express written consent of Company. All legal actions and/or motions
related to blond forfeiture shall be brought in the name of Agent or his or her agency unless the
laws of a particular jurisdiction require otherwise, in which case Agent shall clearly designate
his/her agejicy status in such action(s).
10,
NOTICE TO COMPANY OF PENDING ACTION. Agent shall notify Company in
writing, within seven (7) days of Agent becoming aware of same, of the initiation or existence of
any and allflegal or administrative proceedings wherein Agent is named defendant or the subject
of the administrative action or investigation. Upon request of Company. Agent shall supply
Company with copies of all documents related thereto, and shall supply Company with all
requested Information. This provision does not apply to bail forfeiture or summary judgment
matters.
3
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11.
NON-LIABILITY OF COMPANY FOR SERVICE. Company shall from time
to time, as a courtesy, supply Agent with a listing of Agent's bond forfeiture and shall, in its
discretion and upon terms it may set, provide for the posting of transfer bonds for Agent.
Company in no way guarantees the accuracy of said forfeiture listing; Agent shall maintain his or
her own listing upon which agent shall ultimately rely. Company assumes to responsibility or
liability for the transfer bond process, or notice related thereto. Agent acknowledges the risks
involved wHjh the transfer bond process and fully accepts same, holding Company harmless for
any and all losses related thereto.
12.
AGENT RECORDS AND REPORTS. Agent shall maintain such documents
and records and deliver to Company such documents, records and/or reports as shall be
authorized and/or directed by Company, and all such documents, record or reports shall be open
and available for inspection by Company at all times. If Agent and/or Company terminate their
relationship! hereunder, for any reason, upon request Agent acknowledges Company's superior
claim to sa^me and shall release to Company forthwith all records, documents and reports for
photocopying purposes. Within a reasonable time thereafter, but in no event to exceed thirty (30)
calendar days, Company shatt return said documents, records or reports to Agent, either by
original or dopy in Company's discretion. Agent waives prior notice should Company seek court
order to enforce this paragraph, and hereby stipulates Company is entitled to temporary, ex parte
injunctive orders without notice to enforce these provisions. Agent will provide Company a copy
of any form or written communication associated with the writing of Bonds. Said information will
be supplied for information purposes only.
13.
TERMINATION OF BOND LIABILITY. Agent shall report any and all
terminations of bond liability, on a regular basis, but no later than fifteen (15) days after
exoneration. Any and all bonds exonerated by operation of law or by Agent Initiated motion shall
be reported, and the date of exoneration shall be noted. In Company's discretion, court
documents,' evidencing liability discharge may be required of Agent. Agent shall comply with any
request by. Company for status reports/updates on any large undertakings or forfeitures at any
time Company so requests.
14.
PRESERVATION OF COMPANY'S INTERESTS. Agent shall comply with
any and afl procedural directions, rules, regulations and the like from time to time given and/or
adopted by Company, and unless otherwise directed shall make no alteration, modification or
amendment of any obligation or document of Company; enter into no settlement of claim in the
name of dompany; keep confidential any and all such Company instructions and information;
make no reference to Company in any advertising; and do nothing whatsoever which may create
additional (obligations and liabilities for Company and/or impair Company's goodwill
15.
AGENTS EXPENSES. Except as otherwise set forth herein, Agent shall
bear any And all expenses incurred in the conduct of Agent's business,
16.
GENERAL INDEMNIFICATION. In addition to any and all liability the
following (nay have at law and/or equity for nonperformance of this Agreement, they shall be
jointly and severally responsible to Company as follows:
(a)
General Agent shall indemnity, hold and save Company harmless for 100%
Company t ^ f ,
General AgentC/kL
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of the liability written and collateral attaching thereto; and/or
(b)
Bail Agent shall indemnify, hold and save Company harmless from 100% of
any and all costs, expenses and liabilities, including but not limited to, bond forfeitures, travel
expenses (including food and lodging), telephone and postage expenses, special assistance
fees, special employment expenses, investigators' fees, attorneys' fees, accountants' fees,
experts' fe|ee, collection fees, trial preparation expenses, court costs, penalties, judgments,
judgment execution expenses and the like with Company may sustain or incur from time to time
as a result of, arising from, or in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, including
but not limited to, execution and/or administration of bonds; collection of premiums; forfeiture of
bonds, auqits by Company of and concerning any part hereto; investigation of bonds; negotiation
and settlerjnent of bond claims; location, apprehension, holding movement, extradition and/or
surrender 6f bond principals; collection, protection, investment, transmission and/or application of
collateral; negotiation and settlement of charges, claims and demands of whatever type and
nature; and participation in any judicial proceeding, voluntary and otherwise.
17.
SPECIAL INDEMNIFICATION. In the event of breach of this Agreement by any
party hereto and/or any action by Company to enforce compliance herewith by any party,
notwithstanding anything else herein to the contrary and in addition to and not in derogation of
any and pll liability they or any of them otherwise may have at law and/or equity for
nonperformance of this Agreement, each party hereto, jointly severally, shall indemnify, hold and
save Corrjpany harmless from any and all damages, losses, injuries, costs, expenses and
liabilities, including but not limited to, loss of profits, business assets and/or goodwill, liabilities to
any party \ hereto, liabilities to third persons, travel expenses (including food and lodging),
investigator's fees, attorney's fees, accountant's fees, expert's fees, collection fees, trial
preparation expenses, court costs, penalties, judgment execution expenses and the like which
Company may sustain or incur from time to time as a result of, arising from or in connection with
such breath by any part hereto and/or such action by Company. This special Indemnification
does expressly extend to and include any action brought for tortious and/or intentional
misconduct by General Agent or Agent, or by any person acting as their agent or on their behalf.
18.
INDEMNITY FUND.
(a)
As security for any an all Indemnifications set forth in paragraphs 16 and 17, and
without limitation to scope thereof or liability therefor, Agent shall forthwith deliver to Company a
cash sumjequal to 1% ($10.00per $1000.00) of the total amount of penal liability written for each
bond. The initial and subsequent deposits into, and the income therefrom and the investment
and reinvestment thereof, shall be known as the Indemnity Fund."
(b)
Neither said parties nor anyone else shall be entitled to notice of any action taken or
to be takep by Company hereunder provided, however, that company shall subsequently account
for and justify any such action taken in a manner consistent with proper fiduciary accounting
procedure.
(c)
Company may from time to time, in its sole discretion and for such values as it
deems appropriate, convert non-cash assets, if any, to cash either by sale or otherwise, and
shall, within a reasonable time thereafter, account for and describe such action to Agent.
(d)l Any and all taxes due and payable with respect to Income and/or principal of said
fund shall, be paid by the party making deposits thereto.
5
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(e)
Company may from time to time, withdraw, apply and/or reimburse itself with such
part or all of the principal and/or income hereof as may be necessary (as determined solely by
Company) to preserve and/or maintain said Indemnity Fund.
(0 ; If, when and as Company is elsewhere authorized under this Agreement to
withdraw, apply and/or reimburse itself herefrom by reason of indemnification, it may do so with
such part or all of the principal and/or income hereof as it shall determine.
(g)
Upon termination of this Agreement and after each and every indemnification
hereunder is finally exonerated, determined, and/or otherwise satisfied, that portion of said
Indemnity Fund then remaining shall be delivered to General Agent, and/or Bail Agent free and
clear of this Agreement.
19.
COLLATERAL.
As a condition of this Contract Agent, or if applicable. Agent's
indemnitor (shall provide to Company collateral which shall be agreed upon between the Agent
and the General Agent per the attached "Schedule of Collateral" which shall name Company or
its designeje as beneficiary. This collateral shall be maintained by Company to secure and
guarantee Agent's performance of all terms hereof, and shall be held, applied, liquidated and/or
returned to depositor in a like manner as is described and called for in the above Paragraph 18
entitled Indemnity Fund."
20.
INDEMNIFICATION REMEDIES OF COMPANY.
When and as Company is
entitled to [indemnification under this Agreement and except as provided elsewhere herein for
bond forfeitures, in addition to any other rights and remedies it may have under this Agreement.
at law and/jor equity. Company shall have therightto do any one or more of the following:
(a)
Direct any party hereto so indemnifying Company to pay any part or all of the
underlying loss, expense or obligation.
(b)
Pay any part or all thereof from the Indemnity Fund; and/or
(c)
Pay any part or all thereof and direct and/or make reimbursement to itself in
accordance with (a) and/or (b). All suchrightsof Company to reimbursement shall be primary to
any such rjghts of any other party hereto.
(d)
Direct any party hereto so indemnifying Company to defend any action to protect
Company,jor to refrain from defending Company in Company's sole discretion.
21.
BOND FORFEITURES
Agent shall give Company notice within seven (7) days of
any and aji bond forfeitures threatened and/or declared hereunder on bonds written hereunder
unless Company has received direct notice form the court Agent shall take any and all
necessary] and lawful steps to terminate forfeiture liability within the applicable statutory time
frame. Wnen and as it shall be necessary to pay any such forfeiture or resulting judgment and to
the extent Company is indemnified therefrom, in addition to any other rights and remedies it msy
have und£r this Agreement, at law and/or equity, Company shall have the right to do any one or
more of t^e following:
(a)
Direct any party hereto indemnifying Company therefrom to pay any part or all
thereof;
(b)
Pay any part or all thereof from the Indemnity Fund;
(c)
Pay and/or direct payment of any part or all thereof from any forfeiture collateral
held for such bond;
6
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(d)
; Direct the bond principal and/or anyone guaranteeing, assuring or indemnifying
Company, and/or any other party hereto against loss by reason of the bond principars
noncompliance, to pay any part or all thereof; and/or
(e)
; Pay any part or all thereof and direct and/or make reimbursement thereof to itself in
accordance with (a), (b), (c)f and/or (d). All such rights of Company to reimbursement shall be
primary to any such rights of any other party hereto; any holder of interests in and to collateral
described in (c); and/or anyone described in (d).
22
PRESERVATION OF INDEMNITY FUND.
The Indemnity Fund shall not be
primarily liable for any Indemnification hereunder except insofar as Company may elect to satisfy
same therefrpm or as otherwise authorized hereunder. Should Indemnity Fund withdrawal be
necessary fo^ whatever reason hereunder, Company may, in its sole discretion, require Agent to
reimburse said fund in the amount withdrawn, either forthwith or in installments as deteimined by
Company.
23.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION.
Agent will provide personal financial statement to
Company at bompany's request. Agent also agrees that Company may, at its discretion, request
and receive [personal credit information on agent from consumer reporting agencies. Agent
agrees to prqvide any reasonable personal financial information requested by Company.
24.
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. Company may, from time to time in its
sole discretion, in whole or in part, partially or fully assign any and all right and/or duties
established by this Agreement to any chosen assignee, with or without actual notice of such
Agreement t^> Agent. Company may contact, substitute, or join with any other underwriter, surety
and/or reinsured on any or all bonds hereunder. However, whenever possible, such agreement
shall be evidenced by addendum hereto, executed by all parties to this agreement. No
assignment of any right or obligation hereunder shall be made by Agent without the prior written
consent of Company.
25. , SEVERABILITY.
If any provision or item of this Agreement or the application
thereof is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions, items or application of this
Agreement y*hich can be given effect without the invalid provisions, items or applications, and to
this end the brovisions of this Agreement are hereby declared severable.
26.
FAILURE TO DECLARE BREACH NOT A WAIVER.
The failure of Company to
terminate ui, declare a breach of this Agreement on a particular occasion when such action is
allowed hereunder shall not be construed, interpreted or pleaded as either an express or implied
waiver of the right to do so at a later date, nor shall it be deemed an express or implied waiver of
any right of Obligation hereunder.
27.
APPLICABLE LAW, VENUE AND FORUM. The Agreement is to be interpreted in
accordance (with the laws of the State of Texas. The parties hereto do hereby consent and
stipulate to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Texas for any action brought under this
Agreement.
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28.
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT.
Any party hereto may give written notice at
any time, with or without cause, of his or its desire to terminate this Agreement. Upon such
notice, Agent's right and duty to solicit and executed bail bonds hereunder shall immediately
cease and ferminate. All other rights and duties of each party hereto shall continue thereafter
until final determination and satisfaction of the entire subject matter of this Agreement (including
the exoneration of nay and all bonds executed hereunder prior to such notice) and thereupon this
Agreement shall be finally terminated. Until all Company bonds issued by Agent hereunder are
exonerated or paid, Agent shall remain obligated to fully perform and protect Company as
described elsewhere herein.
29.
MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT
Each of the parties hereto acknowledges
that this Agreement expresses his or its entire understanding; that there have been no
representations made by any party hereto except as set forth herein; and that this Agreement
shall not be ^ubject to change or modification except by execution of another instrument in writing
subscribed tp by each of the parties hereto.
30.
ATTORNEYS FEES.
Should any litigation arise between the parties hereto
related to tHis Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's
fees and coks in addition to any other relief granted.
31.
WRITTEN NOTICES.
Any written notice given hereunder shall be deemed
received by| the addressee upon deposit of the same in the United State Mail with proper first
dass postage affixed thereto, addressed as follows:
(a)

If to Company:
Ranger Insurance Company
Attention* David W. Grobmeier
PO Box 2807
Houston, Texas 77252-2807

(b)

(c)

If to Agent and Agent Indemnitor:

If to General Agent Indemnitor:
North American Bail Bond Services
Attn: Darrell Sutherland
40087 Mission Blvd #386
Fremont, CA 94539

Robert Paul Thorpe and Maria Elizabeth Thorpe
225 W. Grand
Grand Junction, CO 81501

32.
BENEFITS AND OBLIGATION OF SUCCESSORS. This
Agreement
shall
continue apd run to the benefit of and be binding upon the estate, heirs, representatives,
transferee,'successors, and assigns of each party hereto unless such continuation conflicts with
an express! term contained elsewhere herein, or with the intent of the parties as determined from
viewing this Agreement as a whole.
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Company \&
General Agent
^Al

2 6
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Agent j 3 - k >
Indemnitor

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed
as of the day;and year first above written.

RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY

By.
David W. Grobmeier - Assistant Vice President

State of.

c#rLfjUL

oOtiZd

County of

Subscribed and sworn to before me this &uhJC±dav
My Commission expires:

of m

\£L

^*J*8

HIAAAA

kssssssssssssss

.Mcn^id

CK

(Notary Public)!

BARBARA A JONES
Notary P u ^ . Stite ol Teias
llty Commission Eipires 12-31-98

S5SSSSSSSSSSS9

NORTH AMERICAN BAIL BONB SE

GENERAL AGENT
By:
State of

CLfyltC-crt'iK

jjLan

. County of.

Subscribed and sworn to befor« me this / - ? .._ day of.
My Commission expires:
(seal)

<:C'

/

/
/t

t <C

C<L^

(Notary Public)
CAROLE POWER
COMMMB0190

tn

NOfMYPUBUC-CAUTOmU

>-*

VENTURA COUNTY
MyConvnExpifaMar'!1,1996
U1996

2
gj
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Company t
General Agent
Agent.
Indemnitor

^

^fi&fi^r

BAIL A G E N T

State

*_£

County of

/jilt

Kr^/t-c fi.

-XWofl-fxf

)
)ss.

/^1/^iwcMi

j

On f A a r c L . 1\ V ^ i g
before me,
L l Acidic
"*
The undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 0\.c<. r?

U . " o ^ i ^ - L e f It
£-U. ^

»jfr ii*e, or proved to me on the basis of
satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name jafare subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged
to me that t4/*befthey executed the same in fcisfeer/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by feieAer/their
signature(s) orj the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the
instrument.
WITNESS rnv hand and official seal.

(seal)

COM** WW»
•^*^/ Pv±*c - Colfomto

10

|
Z
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Company j E - i J )
General Aocnu.C * t f
Agent;
Indemnitor
~r

ADDENDUM "D"
TITLE 77, CHAPTER 7, U.C.A (1999)

A-29

A-30

VOLUME 4
Complete through the
1998 GENERAL SESSION

LEXIS Law Publishing
Charlottesville, Virginia

A-31

A-32

77-7-3. By private persons.
A private person may arrest another:
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his
presence; or
(2) When a felony h a s been committed and h e h a s
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has committed it.
MM

77-7-7. Force i n m a k i n g arrest.
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after
being informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person'
arresting may use reasonable force to effect t h e arrest. Deadly
force may be used only as provided in Section 76-2-404.
isso

A-33

A-34

ADDENDUM "E"
RULE 6, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A-35

A-36

UTAH CODE
UNANNOTATED
1998
VOLUME 4
Complete through the
1998 GENERAL SESSION

LEXIS Law Publishing
Charlottesville, "Virginia

A-37

A-38

Rule 6. Warrant of arrest or summons.
(a) Upon the return of an indictment the magistrate shall
cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a summons for
the appearance of the accused.
Upon the filing of an information, if it appears from the
information, or from any affidavit filed with the information,
that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the accused has committed it, the magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a
summons for the appearance of the accused.
(b) If it appears to the magistrate that the accused will
appear on a summons and there is no substantial danger of a
breach of the peace, or injury to persons or property, or danger
to the community, a summons may issue in lieu of a warrant
of arrest to require the appearance of the accused. If the
defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue. A warrant
of arrest may issue in cases where the defendant has failed to
appear in response to a summons or citation or thereafter
when required by the court. When a warrant of arrest is
issued, the magistrate shall state on the warrant:
(1) the amount of bail; and
(2) if the magistrate determines that the accused must
appear in court, the name of the law enforcement agency in
the county or municipality with jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
(c)(1) The warrant shall be executed by a peace officer. The
summons may be served by a peace officer or any person
authorized to serve a summons in a civil action.
(2) The warrant may be executed or the summons may be
served at any place within the state.
(3) The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the
defendant. The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest, but upon request shall
show the warrant to the defendant as soon as practicable. If
the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at the
time of the arrest, he shall then inform the defendant of the
offense charged and of the fact that the warrant has been
issued. The summons shall be served as in civil actions, or by
mailing it to the defendant's last known address.
(4) The person executing a warrant or serving a summons
shall make return thereof to the magistrate as soon as
practicable. At the request of the prosecuting attorney, any
unexecuted warrant shall be returned to the magistrate for
cancellation.

A-39

A-40

ADDENDUM "F"
77-20-8.5(2), U.C.A. (1999)

A-41

A-42

VOLUME 4
Complete through the
1999 GENERAL SESSION

LEXIS Law Publishing
Charlottesville, Virginia

A-43

A-44

77-20-8JS. Sureties — Surrender of defendant—Arrest
of defendant.
(1) (a) The sureties may at any time prior to a forfeiture of
their bail surrender the defendant and obtain exoneration
of their bail by filing written requests at the time of the
surrender.
(b) Tb effect surrender, certified duplicate copies of the
undertaking shall be delivered to a peace officer, who shall
detain the defendant in his custody as upon a commitment, and shall in writing acknowledge the surrender
upon one copy of the undertaking. This certified copy of
the undertaking upon which the acknowledgment of surrender is endorsed shall be filed with the court Tlie court
may then, upon proper application, order the undertaking
exonerated and may order a refund of any paid premium,
or part of a premium, as it finds just.
(2) For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the
sureties may arrest him at any time before they are finally
exonerated and at any place within the state.
(3) A surety acting under this section is subject to the
provisions of Title 53, Chapter 10, Bail Bond Recovery.
isss

A-45

A-46

ADDENDUM "G"
TITLE 53, CHAPTER 11

A-47

A-48

VOLUME 2
Complete through the
1999 GENERAL SESSION

LEXIS Law Publishing
Charlottesville, Virginia

A-49

A-50

53-11-107. Licenses — Classifications — Prohibited
acts.
(1) Licenses under this chapter are issued in the classifications of:
(a) bail enforcement agent;
(b) bail recovery agent; or
(c) bail recovery apprentice.
(2) A person may not:
(a) act or assume to act as, or represent himself to be,
a licensee unless he is licensed under this chapter; or
(b) falsely represent that he is employed by a licensee.
l3) The commissioner shall issue licenses to applicants who
qualify for them under this chapter.
(4) A license issued under this chapter is not transferable or
assignable.
1998
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53-11-108. L i c e n s u r e — B a s i c qualifications.
An applicant for licensure under this chapter shall meet the
following qualifications:
(1) An applicant shall be:
(a) at least 21 years of age;
(b) a citizen or legal resident of the United States;
and
(c) of good moral character.
(2) An applicant may not:
(a) have been convicted of:
(i) a felony;
(ii) any act involving illegally using, carrying,
or possessing a dangerous weapon;
(iii) any act of personal violence or force on
any person or convicted of threatening to commit
any act of personal violence or force against
another person;
(iv) any act constituting dishonesty or fraud;
(v) impersonating a peace officer: or
(vi) any act involving moral turpitude;
<b) be on probation, parole, community supervision, or named in an outstanding arrest warrant; or
(c) be employed as a peace officer.
(3) If previously or currently licensed in another state
or jurisdiction, the applicant shall be in good standing
within that state or jurisdiction.
(4) (a) The applicant shall also have completed a training program of not less than 16 hours t h a t is approved by the board and includes:
\i) instruction on the duties and responsibilities of a licensee under this chapter, including:
(A) search, seizure, and arrest procedure;
(B) pursuit, arrest, detainment, and
transportation of a bail bond suspect; and
(C) specific duties and responsibilities regarding entering an occupied structure to
carry out functions under this chapter;
(ii) the laws and rules relating to the bail bond
business;
(iii) the rights of the accused; and
(iv) ethics.
(b) The program may be completed after the licensure application is submitted, but shall be completed
before a license may be issued under this chapter.
(5) If the applicant desires to carry a firearm as a
licensee, the applicant shall:
(a) successfully complete a course regarding the
specified types of weapons he plans to carry. The
course shall:
(i) be not less t h a n 16 hours;
(ii) be conducted by any national, state, or
local firearms training organization approved by
the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Division created in Section 53-10-103; and
(iii) provide training regarding general familiarity with the types of firearms to be carried,
including:
(A) the safe loading, unloading, storage,
and carrying of the types of firearms to be
concealed; and
(B) current laws defining lawful use of a
firearm by a private citizen, including lawful
self-defense, use of deadly force, transportation, and concealment; and
(b) shall hold a valid license to carry a concealed
weapon, issued under Section 53-5-704.
1999
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53-11-109. Licensure — Bail enforcement agent.
(1) (a) In addition to the requirements in Sections 53-11108 and 53-11-110, an applicant for licensure as a hail
enforcement agent shall have a minimum of 2,000 hours
of experience consisting of either actual bail recovery
work, or work as a law enforcement officer for a federal,
state, or local governmental agency.
(b) The applicant shall substantiate the experience
claimed under Subsection (1) as qualifying experience and
shall provide:
(i) the exact details as to the character and nature
of the experience on a form prescribed by the department; and
(ii) certification by the applicant's employers,
which is subject to independent verification by the
board.
(c) If an applicant is unable to supply written certification of experience from an employer in whole or in part, an
applicant may offer written certification from persons
other than an employer covering the same subject matter
for consideration by the board.
(d) The burden of proving completion of the required
experience is on the applicant.
(2) An applicant for license renewal shall have completed
not less than eight hours of continuing classroom instruction.
1996

53-11-111. Licensure — Bail recovery agent — Requirements and limitations.
(1) (a) In addition to the requirements in Sections 53-11108 and 53-11-113, an applicant for licensure as a bail
recovery agent shall meet all of the requirements under
Section 53-11-109, but instead of the experience requirement under Subsection 53-ll-109(lXa), a bail recovery
agent applicant shall have a minimum of 1,000 hours of
experience consisting of either actual bail recovery work,
or work as a law enforcement officer for a federal, state, or
local governmental agency.
(b) The applicant shall substantiate the experience
claimed under Subsection (1) as qualifying experience and
shall provide:
(i) the exact details as to the character and nature
of the experience on a form prescribed by the department; and
(ii) certification by the applicant's employers,
which is subject to independent verification by the
board.
(c) If an applicant is unable to supply written certification of experience from an employer in whole or in part, an
applicant may offer written certification from persons
other than an employer covering the same subject matter
for consideration by the board.
(d) The burden of proving completion of the required
experience is on the applicant.
(2) An applicant for license renewal shall have completed
not less than eight hours of continuing classroom instruction.
(3) A bail recovery agent may work as a licensee under this
chapter only as an employee of or as an independent contractor with a bail bond agency. A bail recovery agent may not:
(a) advertise his services;
(b) provide services as a licensee under this chapter
directly for members of the public; or
(c) employ or hire as independent contractors bail enforcement agents, bail recovery agents, or bail recovery
apprentices.
1999
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53-11-113. Bail recovery agent and bail recovery apprentice licensure — Liability insurance —
Fee — Workers' compensation.
(1) An applicant for licensure as a bail recovery agent or as
a bail recovery apprentice shall provide as part of the application:
(a) the full name and address of the applicant;
(b) two passport-size color photographs of the applicant;
(c) the name of the bail bond recovery agency for which
the applicant will be an employee or with which the
applicant will be an independent contractor;
(d) written indication by a bail bond recovery agency or
its designee that it intends to employ or contract with the
applicant; and
(e) a notarized statement of the applicant's experience
and qualifications required under Section 53-11-111 or
53-11-112, as appropriate.
(2) The licensure application or renewal shall be accompanied by the fee required under Section 53-11-115.
(3) (a) A license or a license renewal for a bail recovery
agent or a bail recovery apprentice may not be granted to
an applicant unless the employing bail bond recovery
agency has on file with the department evidence of
current workers' compensation coverage.
(b) A bail recovery agent or bail recovery apprentice
license may not be reinstated without providing verification of the reinstatement of the workers' compensation
coverage and payment of the reinstatement fee required
in Section 53-11-115.
(c) The provisions of this Subsection (3) do not apply to
a bail recovery agent or bail recovery apprentice who is
working for a bail bond recovery agency as an indepen1998
dent contractor.

A-54

53-11-130. Requirement to identity employing agency.
Upon request, a licensee shall immediately identify the
name, buainesa address, and telephone number of the bail
bond agency for which the licensee is an employee or an
independent contractor.
im

53-11-122. Requirements during search and seizure —
Notification of law enforcement agency.
A bail enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail
recovery apprentice shall observe the following requirements
before taking action authorized under this chapter:
(1) identify himself as a "bail enforcement agent," "bail
recovery agent," or "bail recovery apprentice"; and
(2) comply with the notification requirements of Section 53-11-123.
ISM

53-11-124. Penalties.
Any violation of this chapter is a class A misdemeanor,
unless the circumstances of the violation amount to an offense
subject to a greater criminal penalty under Title 76, Utah
Criminal Code.
ists

A-55

A-56

ADDENDUM "H"
BAIL CONTRACT

A-57

A-58

^RANGER

BAIL BOND APPLICATION & CONTKAC

10777 Westheimer Road 77042

P O Box 2807
Houston Texas 77252 2807
(713)954 8100
(713)954 8389 (FAX)

BJNSURANCE
AGENT

H'?>
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Offense.

_Case * _
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_ Power #

. Amount .
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. Power #
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Court _

. Appearance Date _

_ Time

•W*3 S-7f?'7b.
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. Expiration _
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GRANGER

BAIL BOND APPLICATION & CONTRACT

10777 Wa»lh«u»ir Road 7/042
P 0 . Box 2807
Houston, Ttxas 77252-2807
(713)954-8100
(713) 854-4389 (FAX)
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I hava f»d «4 had axpiamad,lo m» and undanland Iha Mowino larmt and condiltont ol RANQER INSURANCE COMPANY (haramaftar catM RANOER) axacuimo Iha abova luted Sur.iy B*M Bond* on my
banal!

1.

RANQER than haVa oonlrol and iunadtctmn ovar m» during Iha larm lor which my bail bondfi) M avacutad and ihaH hava Iha fight lo appfatond and lunandar ma lo Iha propar oNioaJa at any lima

for violation of my ban bond(i) oMgaiiona lo Iha Court and RANOER aa providad by law.
2.

K M undaratood arid aoraad that any ona of Ihatofiowmgaction! by tM ahall conaWuta a braach of my oMgalioni to RANQER and that RANOER and/or Na Agant ahaN hava Iha right to forthwith

apprahand and aunartdar ma mjaaonaration of my baa* pond(s):
a.

H I dJpart tha Jurisdiction of Iha Court without Iha wrMan conianl of Iha Court and RANQER, ortfiAgant.

b.

II l srjal mova Upm ona addrtit lo anothar or changa my phona rRjmbar without notifying RANQER, and/or I U Aganl.

e.

It I commit any act which shaN conaMula raaaonabla avidanca of my mlanlron to cauaa a iorfaHura of my bail bond(s).

d.

HI arfi a/ra*lad and incarcaralad lor any otlansa othar than a minor Iramc vioialion.

a

I I I maka any malarial latta tlatamant m my Bart Bond Application and Contract with RANOER.

3.
I I I dapan tha iumdwtion d tha Court wharam my bail bond(«) u poatad by RANOER lor any raaaon, and I in capturad by RANQER and/or da Aganl. or any law anlorcamanl agancy. m a Slala othar
than tha ona m which my bail b^ndta) i« posted, I haraby agr»a lo volunlartiy ralurn lo tha Simla of original |unadidioA. and I haraby waiva axlraddiofl pmcaadmga and lurthar conaant lo tha appticalion ol such
raaaonaMa torca aa may ba nacaaiarv to mttmet iueh »ium

You are assuming specific obligations * READ CAREFULLY!
>i*een Iht undartiQnad I V U +
THIIAGREEMENT mada ban
'—>
II
heietn ettai caked tndemndoita) and RANGER U^UrVkNCT^OMPANY (hereinafter callad CompTnftT
WITNEeMETHt
WHEfttA* the Con^ieny hat executo* or» abouttoexecute mbehtf^
mdamndy htrain provided, which application it Hataby referred lo and mada a part of tfut agreement,
NOW THCRCFOAE. m contidarabon ol tha execution by tha Company of such bond or umtortekmg, Iha lndammlor(t) covenenttft) and agreefa) wdh tha Company at foUowa:
f.
Tha lndamnaor(t) wdl pay iha Company, or at duly audiomed egoM, iha prtmwm<t) tpecwed in aaid appticetwn at tha Mmtt and m Iha amounit lhaiam tlafed.
2.
Tha lndemn»or(t) wdl ej ak timet mdammfy and keep indemnified Iha company and tava harmlata Iha Company Irom and aoaintl any and all claims, damandt. eabtldies, cotlt, charoat. legal
leas, dtsburtemertft and •xpeneet of avary kind and nature, which Iha Company thaN at any tuna tualam or mcur, and at waM from all ordart, dagreet, Judgmerdt and pdjudtcafiont againtt Iha Company by
reason or m oonteojuence of hevidg executed tuoh bond or undertaking m beheM of and/or al tha inetance of Iha |ndamnaon» (or any of tham) and wdl pay over, reimburse and make Qood to tha Company, ke
successors and assigns aH sums' and amounta of monay required to maat avary daim, demand, aabkdy. cotlt. expense, awl, order, daeraa. payment and/or adpidicahOA against Iha Company by raaton of
tha execute* of tuch bond or uncWrtelung and any othar bondt or undertakings executed in bahalf of and/or at Iha malanea of tha lndemndor(t> and before tha Company ahaN ba required lo pay iharaundar.
Tha aaaday tor legal taat and disbursements inctudat a» legal lees and disbursements tltej tte t 2 c * ^ ^
defend at nghl to coked or to charge lor any legal taat and/or diaburtamanlt incurrad m earner proceedings.
3.
Tha lndamn«or(t) wdl artmediatery notdy Iha Company of Iha making of any damand or tha paying of any nouce or tha commancamant of any proceeding or Iha fauna of any Itabrkty which Iha
Company may ba required to dweharge by raaaon of tha aMculion of any tuch bond or undertaking.
4.
TIM vowchara or othpravManca of p a y ^ ^ by ilia Company, m otocftarge of a*y eattlfly imoW or m ^ ^
bond or undertaking, or incurred m connection wdh dny
coiateral held by iha Company. thak ba conclueive evidence agamtl tha Indemndorft) of tha tact and amount of tha eabddy otthe Indamnilorla) to tha Company.
5.
In tha avant tha Company executes any bond or undortalung wdh Co-Suretiet, or ramturat any portion of any tuch bond or undartalung, or procurat tha execuhon of any tuch bond or
undarlaking. Iha lndemndor<t) egraaft) mat all of iha tarma and oonddMMt of tlut mtlriNnanl shaft apply to and oparata for Iha banafd of tha Company, ma procurad aurahaa anoVOr co-sureties ertOVpr j
remeurert at the* respective mtaratlt may appear.
f>
Tha Company thak hava iha nght al any tune, without nouce to iha Indemndorfs), to iraneter and attign Ihw agraamant and/or Iha coiateral pladgad hereunder, to any parton, Ramturar, Co-;
Suraty Suraty or Insurance Company which mmf taka ovar and attuma m whofa or in part, tha obligation of tha Company undar any tuch bond or undarlaking and lhaiaupon Iha Iranaleree thai bacoma
vetted wdh ak tha powert and nghtt gtvan to tha Company haraundar and tha Company thai ba relieved and tutly diachargad Irom any aabiaty or responsibility lor aaid colalaral undar thit agraamant.
7
Tha lndamniior(t) agree(t) thai Iha Company may al any tuna taka tuch stop* at k may daam nacaatary to obtam at release Irom any and an aabaay undar any of aaid bondt or undanakmgt
and it thak not ba nacaatary tor ma Company to give Iha Indamndorlt) notica of any fad or mformalion coming to tha Company*! nouca or knowladga concarnmg or aNacting da nghit or kabdity undar any
tuch bond or undertaking notica of ak tuch bemg haraby expretary waived, and that tha Company may tacura and lurther indemnity deal agamtl tott, damagat and/or expenses m connection wdh any tuch1
bond or undertaking m any manner k may thmk proper mcluding turrendcr of the delendanttedherbefore or altar lorlekure and/or payment) if tha Company thak daam tha tame advisable, and aH expentet
whjch me Company may sustain or incur m obtammg tuch releaae or in further eeconng dsetf agamal Iota, aha* ba borne and paaf by tha indemrtdon*e).
8.
Tha mdemnoor(t) haraby authorua(s) any attorney ot any court of record to appear tor him or tham m and before any court, m any action, auk or proceeding, and receive procett on behatf of the
indemmtor(i) or waive the neumg and tarvice of procett, »nd attar or confett judgment, or permk judgment to ba entered, agamet the fndemndor(t), {jointly and/or jomtfy and teveraky) m favor of the
Company for the amount of anytyrtadurewhich may be taken agamtl the Company on tha taid bond or undertaking and tor tha amount of any and ak tumt hereinabove m paragrapht 1 2 and 7 referred to
and to reteaee ak error and waive ak right to etey of execution or appeal, and to do and perform ak acta and execme ak papart m the name of Irtdemtutorft) m order to carry into triad the authority hereinabove
given m at luk and ample manner at tha lndemndorf.a) might do if peraonaffy ptatent, hereby raidymg and confammg ak thai the taid aitomay ahak do or oaute lo ba done by virtue thereof and
tndamnrtorft) haraby irrevocably warve(a) me beneld or advantage of any and ak valuation, tlay, appraitament or homattaad axamption law or lawa of any ttala of tha United Stated, now m force or hereafter
led
9.
Tint malrumant thak be binding not only upon the indemnitor (or Indemnaort, Jointly and/or kNntty and ttveiaky), but as wak upon tha heirt, axecutort, admrnrttralora, auccettort and aatignt of
10
Tha Company retervee the ngM todackne to ntue the bond for which application it hereby made, and no claim thak be mada agamtl tha Company m contequence of at fadure to execute tuch
bond: nor thak any claim be made m cata the bond, 4 executed, be not accepted by or on behak ot tha obbgae.
11. Tha Indemneprtt) heVeby wanant(t) that tha foregoing dectarauont maida and antwert given are the truth without retervalion and are mada tor the purpote of includmg the Company to become
turety or to procure turetytrwp on^he bond or undertaking applied tor harem, wdh the intent and purpoee that they be luky relied on.
12. The Company thak hot be ttrtl obliged to proceed agamtl the Prmctpatit) on any tuch bond or undertaking before having recourse agamtl the lndemnnor(t) or any ol ihem, the tndeinntfor(t)
heieby expretety waiving the benatd or any taw raquamg the Company to maka claim upon or proceed or enforce dt remodrtw agamtl tha PrampaHs) betore making damand upon or proceeding anavor
enlorcmg at ramedMit agamtl any mdamndor.
13. The acceptance of ttyt Agraamant and of tha Indammlorft) agraamant to pay prarmumt on tha execution and on tha continuance of taid bond(t) on undertaking^), and/or tha acceptance al any
time by the Company of the other coaateral tecurdy or agreement, thak not in any way abridge or kmd the nghl of the Company to ba subrogated to any nght of remedy, or hmd any nghl or lemedy which Iha
Company may otherwise have, acquire exercttt or enforce under thit or any othar agreement or by law allowed, and tha Company thak hava every nghl and remedy which an individual surety acung wdhout
compentabon would have, ak tudh nghtt btmg conttiuad to bt commutative and lor the eoto beneld of the Company, dt tucceetort and/or dt aatignt.
14. If any provitton or provwiom of ttut mtlrumant be void or unenforceable under the laws of any place governing dt contirucUon or enlorcamant. thit mttrument thak not be void or vdialed thereby
but thak be construed and entorcad wdh the same eked as though such provision or provisions omdtad.
15. In making apptioatiodtortha hmetnebove dasenbad Bad Bond we warrant ak of the statements mada on Iha reverse ol this mstrumenl lo ba true and we agree to advise the Company or ds agent
of any change fetpeciaky change of addrettl wdhm 4* hours after such change has occurred and agree thai any fadurd to to notify shatt ba causa tor the immediate surrender of Iha datandanl without any
| kabditytorMM latum of any part of the piamtum.
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ADDENDUM "I"
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

A-63

A-64

Instructions Given

A-65

A-66

INSTRUCTION NO.

2%

You are instructed that if you find that Ranger delegated authority to apprehend
Gerald Lee to Miles Langley, he had the power to lawfully make an arrest.

A-67

INSTRUCTION NO.

A

If you find the arrest was lawful, it was the obligation, of the person being arrested to
submit 10 that arrest.

A-68
/oil

Plaintiffs' Instructions Rejected

A-69

A-70

INSTRUCTION NO.

f'

FALSE IMPRISONMENT INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff claims the Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned by the Defendant and
suffered injuries as a result in one or more of the following respects: Gerald Lee claims
that Miles Langley had no legal authority to act as a bail enforcement agent in the state
of Utah. Mr. Lee further claims that when Miles Langley took custody of him by force that
a false imprisonment occurred.
George Lee claims that Miles Langley had no legal authority to enforce a bail bond
in the state of Utah and when he entered the home of George Lee and physically
assaulted Mr. Lee that he acted with the intent to confine or restrain George Lee.
Miles Langley has denied that he acted wrongfully.

Reference:
MUJ110.14

A-71

INSTRUCTION NO. _±
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following elements to prevail on
a claim of false imprisonment:
1.

The Defendant acted, intending to confine or restrain the Plaintiff; and

2.

The Defendant's actions resulted in the confinement or restraint of the

Plaintiff; and
3.

The Plaintiff was conscious of the confinement or restraint or was

harmed by it; and
4.

The Defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to believe

the Plaintiff committed an offense.
A person is restrained when that person is not free, or reasonably believes [he]
[she] [they] person is not free, to leave a place to which that person has been confined
and does not consent to the restraint.

References:
MUJ110.15
Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979)
Haas v. Emmett, 23 Utah 2d 138,459 P.2d 432 (1969)
Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400,375 P.2d 458 (1962)
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1964)
IJI § 42.34

A-72

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

Be advised that Utah law requires that a bail recovery agent operate only when
licensed by the state of Utah.

Reference:
Title 53, Chapter 11, UCA.

A-73

INSTRUCTION NO.

&

Be advised that Utah law allows citizens without law enforcement authority to make
arrests. The law provides, however, that such arrests may be made by private persons
only where there has been a public offense committed or attempted in his presence or
when a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe the person
arrested has committed it.

Reference:
Section 77-7-3, UCA

A-74

INSTRUCTION NO.

*?

NEGLIGENCE - INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION
In this case the Plaintiffs claim the Defendant was negligent in the following
respects: Miles Langley, acting without benefit of a required license and legal authority
entered the premises of George Lee to make an arrest without authority and engaged in
a fight which caused the Plaintiffs' injuries.
To return a verdict for the Plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
1.

The Defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged

by the Plaintiff; and
2.

The Defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's

injuries.
If you find in favor of the Plaintiff on those two questions, you must then decide the
amount of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff.

References:
MUJI 3.1
JIFUNo.2.4(1957)

A-75

INSTRUCTION NO.

(6

RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or
property. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care
does not require extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an
ordinary, prudent person uses in similar situations.
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation. You
must decide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar situation.
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act.
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent conduct
may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or damages.

References:
MUJI 3.2
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985)
Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981)
Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 23 Utah 2d 252,461 P.2d 466 (1969)
Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964)
JIFU Nos. 15.1,15.2, 15.3,15.4 (1957)
BAJI Nos. 3.00 (1986), 3.10 (1986), 3.11 (Supp. 1992), 3.12 (Supp. 1992)
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